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Introduction 
 
The exploration of the origins of the Industrial Revolution (IR) in Europe has 
generated a long-standing and controversial debate. The criticisms addressed to 
Landes (1998) last work, were representative of the main controversy divide: the 
accusation of "Eurocentrism", which means explaining the European success by 
its unique character signaling superiority. A group of scholars, baptized by 
Goldstone (2009) as the “Californian school” , proceeded to show that from the 
beginning of modernity in the XVI century to the end of the XVII, the level of 
wealth, development, and growth between the two extremes of Eurasia was 
similar  and the supposedly unique character of Western society was the product 
of the "imagination of Eurocentric historians. It was the "Eurasian similarity 
thesis."  For Perdue (2005), it would be wrong even to point out the competition 
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This article argues that cultural and political legacies from the 
Middle Ages were crucial for the socio-political and economic 
evolution that led to the Industrial Revolution. The medieval 
social/political orders had an exceptional openness to innovations 
(technological, organizational, and institutional) when compared 
to other contemporary civilizations. An openness resulting from 
the competition:  between them and their multiple organizations 
independent from the State. The emergence of national states 
changed the medieval scenario. However, a legacy of some of its 
essential cultural/institutional features remained and played a 
decisive role in the forthcoming Industrial Revolution: the Rule of 
Law, individualism, representative assemblies, the respect for 
labor and professions (notably the merchants) and the embryo of 
a culture of economic growth.    
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between the European States, something prevailing in other civilizational spaces 
as well till 1750. Alternatively, as defended by Rosenthal and Wong (2011), the 
European institutions were not more favorable to economic growth than the 
Chinese ones, on the contrary. So, if the IR happened to occur in Europe, it was 
caused by contingent factors such as colonial exploitation, commercial expansion, 
governance, and geography.  
Regarding the colonial exploitation as a cause of the IR looting labor and 
natural resources from the world – the Marxist authors are in a peculiar position. 
For them, the IR was the inevitable result of the capitalist productive forces 
development, something specific to Europe. However, to arrive at the IR the 
development of the capitalist productive forces depended on an exogenous 
element: a "primitive capital accumulation" by looting the world's riches. For 
Pomeranz (2000) and Hobson (2004), the colonial exploitation was also a 
decisive, however a contingent factor. For others, the commercial expansion, not 
exploitation, regardless if backed by force or not, was a decisive factor explaining 
the IR as it provided economies of scale, which would be essential to, at least, 
start it (Deane and Cole, 1962). Hobsbawn (1977) stressed its importance to the 
British cotton industry, which started the IR. For Inikori (2002), more than an 
initial condition, the expansion of the international trade was the primary cause 
of the IR in England, as it stimulated technological innovation; the first 
"exportled" industrialization in history!  
As for the governance – the role of the State in promoting industrialization it 
is worth note the work of Vries (2015). For him, this was the big difference 
between Britain and China, capable of explaining the great divergence. It was so 
decisive a factor that the relevant divide of the controversy should be reframed: 
in one side those, the institutionalists like Landes (1998), pointing out the lead of 
the private sector and, on the other side, those like him seeing the State as the 
leading promoter of the IR. Finally, the contingent geographic argument. For 
Morris (2010), geography was critical – location, location, location! – to the point 
of pushing forward Europe in a period when it was a backyard region as 
compared to Asia. 
For “Eurocentrics” like North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012), the peculiar European features were primarily institutional. A 
new set of critical institutional innovations were consolidated in England in the 
17th century, thus, creating the conditions for the emergence of an open access 
social order or inclusive political institutions, which were the necessary conditions 
for a process of sustained economic growth leading to the IR. McCloskey (2006, 
2010 and 2016) criticizes this institutionalist view, arguing that in this 
perspective the institutions appear somewhat ad hoc as a fundamental 
explanatory factor, when in fact, they would be part of a process that starts with 
a decisive cultural change from 1700 on, brought about by the rise of the 
bourgeoisie and its values – bourgeois virtues, dignity, and equality. Mokyr 
(1990, 2010, 2016) has the same perspective, though focusing on the cultural 
phenomenon represented by the emergence of a “culture of growth” in the 16th 
century. However, although Mokyr and McCloskey acknowledge for the medieval 
roots of these cultural phenomena, they downplay its legacy. The argument 
developed here is intended to show, on the contrary, the importance of this 
legacy. To show why the origins of the IR are in the peculiar traits of a new 
Civilization that emerged in the European Middle Ages. As the analyzes of 
medievalists like White (1962) and Gimpel (1975), among others, suggest, the 
18th century IR was much more the result of an unprecedented evolutionary 
process that started in the Middle Ages when a "mutant Civilization" first 
Open Science Journal 
Research Article  
Open Science Journal – May 2020  3 
emerged – an expression used by Braudel (1979) to characterize a Civilization 
that permanently changes itself by allowing the introduction of all sorts of 
innovations (technological, organizational, institutional and cultural). A situation 
in stark contrast to that of all other civilizations, in which an aversion to 
innovations prevailed as they were disruptive to established orders considered 
ideals. As Needham (1969, p.119) noted, Europe had something like an "intrinsic 
quality of instability" in sharp contrast to the Chinese "spontaneous homeostasis. 
 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) are correct when they postulate that the 
history of nations' wealth and poverty is the history of overcoming the inherent 
resistance from political orders to the "creative destruction" process by the 
systematic introduction of innovations. Economic growth is "subversive" because 
its continuity depends on the continuous introduction of innovations that affect 
all society's spheres of activity, creating winners and losers. For this reason, the 
process of introduction of innovations the political orders need to constitute as 
such tend to cease as they consolidate .The   vested interests behind consolidated 
political orders begin to react against the introduction of innovations viewed as 
threats; even the general population that supports these orders through painful 
labor also come to consider them as permanent 'natural' orders, the custodians of 
honorable traditions (religious, cultural, social). 
In medieval Europe a different, unprecedented, situation occurred. The 
medieval political orders had this "intrinsic quality of instability" due to peculiar 
cultural and political characteristics that interacted to prevent the blocking of 
the introduction of innovations. A culture that also favored the work of 
manipulating nature in search for better material comfort within a general 
competitive order: the competition between feudal orders and, within them, the 
existence of self regulated institutions and organizations independent from the 
State that exerted a counterpower. That was an exceptional situation that offered 
an unparalleled degree of freedom to innovate.  
In short, the comparative historical analysis shows that, in Western Europe, 
peculiar cultural and political features combined to drive a new civilizational 
path since the fall of the Roman Empire that was different from those followed 
by all civilizations. The Industrial Revolution did not occur there by chance but 
was the result of an evolutionary process driven by the introduction of 
innovations beginning at the High Middle Ages. Capitalism, Industrial 
Revolution, and Modernity were path pendent European phenomena which, for 
the first time in the history of human civilization, shattered the "glass ceiling" 
that had blocked a sustained economic growth in all civilizations that could have 
led to an Industrial Revolution.  
 The article starts with an analysis of cultural factors (2) in two subsections, 
one (2.1) on the worldview of the period and another (2.2) on the emergence of 
individualism. Then, it follows an analysis of the political/institutional factors 
(3). The following section (4) is dedicated to the analysis of the actors of the 
evolutionary political/institutional/cultural processes and has been subdivided 
into five subsections: (4.1) the peculiarity of feudal states in Europe; (4.2) the 
role of an independent religious organization; (4.3) the autonomy of the 
universities; (4.4) the entrepreneurship of the monastic orders; (4.5) the 
independence of the cities. The objective of the fifth section (5) is to show the 
economic consequences of such political/cultural dynamics. The sixth section (6) 
comprises the final considerations. 
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The cultural factors 
  
A peculiar worldview 
  
Although originating in the Middle East, the Judeo-Christian worldview 
blossomed in Latin Europe in all its potential as an essential cultural factor to 
explain the extraordinary innovation dynamics observed since the beginnings of 
what eventually became the Western Civilization. In this worldview, the human 
being is seen as the center of divine creation and has nature at its service. For 
White (1967), this fact led to a desacralization of nature, in which God and the 
Saints substituted nature as the divine/spiritual locus, thus, providing much 
greater freedom to its manipulation. Furthermore, manipulating nature is the 
very essence of innovative technical progress, as noted by Mokyr (1990). Another 
characteristic of this worldview is a linear concept of time, usually progressive 
towards a better world, although it could be regressive. This concept is in sharp 
contrast to the cyclical conceptions prevalent in other civilizations, where the 
idea of progress was lacking. Finally, the respect for labor found in the Old and 
New Testaments, which, beginning in medieval Latin Christianity monasteries, 
translated into a much respected social value, in sharp contrast too to the 
prevailing view of labor as something degrading. 
 For Le Goff (1990), the social attitudes developed during this period of the 
Western civilizational process were decisive for its future. Regarding labor, 
starting from a tradition of contempt (including to the work of engineers) 
inherited from the Greco-Roman world and from a pessimistic idea of working as 
a curse, punishment, and penance, it evolved by multiple paths to an attitude of 
appreciation with a proper concept and vocabulary for labor and laborers. The 
monasteries played a crucial role in this process, in the solution of a socio-
ideological conflict regarding labor stemming from The Rule of Saint Benedict, 
“ora et labora." Working is a penance, yes, but a blessed penance  
The conflict between the two great monastic orders of the period, Cluny and 
Citeaux, had as one of its motivations precisely the relative weight that should be 
attributed to each of these Benedictine injunctions. In the end, Citeaux’s idea of 
labor prevailed, as something that dignifies the human person, worthy of 
heavenly blessings as represented by the patron saints of the corporations. These 
corporations, as will be seen later, were decisive organizational innovations for 
medieval commercial and preindustrial revolutions. Oxele (1990) also points that 
the consolidation of the mental schema associating three ranking orders with 
three social functions in the 11th century, in which the social function of labor 
was placed alongside the social functions of prayer and military protection 
(oratores, bellatores et laboratores), reveals a remarkable appreciation of work. 
The “laboratores” began to appear far more actively in historical settings through 
social organizations of peasants, artisans, and merchants, which grouped 
themselves into sworn associations in public oaths for mutual assistance and 
protection. 
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Individualism versus familism 
  
 Another fundamental cultural factor was the medieval European 
exceptionalism regarding the end of tribalism. State effectiveness depends on the 
displacement, to some degree, of an individual's loyalty from family/kin group to 
State. However, in all civilizations, institutions based on territory and centralized 
legal authority had to be superimposed on societies where the familism from 
tribal origins remained as the primary organizational force of society's members – 
societies based on agnatic lines (patrilineal) (Fukuyama, F.2011). In the 
European case, the networks of familial relations as the basis of the political 
relations disappeared with the emergence of feudalism, as a result of two forces 
acting simultaneously. The first was the sociocultural influence of a religious 
institution that, since the end of the Roman Empire, had been spreading a new 
pattern of marriage in Western Europe. As Goody (1983) showed, the 
Mediterranean pattern was strongly patrilineal, resulting in a society segmented 
into endogenous groups with rigidly defined boundaries, and with a particular 
preference for marriage between cousins. There was a strict separation of the 
sexes and very few opportunities for women to own property or take part in the 
public sphere. 
In the new pattern of marriage promoted by the Catholic Church, inheritance 
became bilateral (by man and woman), intermarriage banned, and exogamy 
stimulated. The Church also banned other familial strategies to maintain the 
property within the family group, such as widows’ marriage within the family, 
the divorce of women by men, concubinage, and adoption of children in the 
absence of a male heir. Women came to have greater property rights and 
participation in public life. The role of women in converting pagan kings is 
noteworthy, being crucial for the expansion of Christianity in Europe – beginning 
with the conversion of Clovis, king of the Franks in the 8th century, under the 
decisive influence of his wife, Clotilde. Pernoud (1980) pointed out the significant 
number of similar cases to show it was not a coincidence but the result of the 
strong attraction Christianity exerted on women by proclaiming and promoting 
equal rights between men and women; as a result, women became active 
evangelical preachers. By the end of the 4th century, thanks to the influence of 
the Catholic Church, the Roman civil law had already been modified, especially 
the removal of the father's right to the life and death of his children. This change 
was particularly beneficial to daughters who tended to be sacrificed if there was 
already a female firstborn. 
 It is worth notice that the empowerment of women in the new type of 
marriage promoted by the Catholic Church was not in disagreement with the 
status of women in the Germanic tribes that invaded the Roman Empire, judging 
by the evidence available from certain peculiar characteristics of these tribal 
societies. Among these characteristics, Jones (1987, pp.14-15) points the 
persistent tendency to keep population growth below what would be its 
maximum to maintain land available for pasture and forests, resulting in 
consumption patterns (especially of meat) different from those prevailing in Asia. 
Individuals in these tribal societies were willing to exchange children for goods at 
the margin to maintain a given standard of consumption, which “empowered” 
women. Based on Hajnal's (1965) study, Jones notes the prevalence of later 
marriages and a high percentage of unmarried individuals as a distinctive 
European element – women had the right not to marry. Individuals were 
encouraged to accumulate goods before marriage and constituted nuclear families 
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relatively independent from larger familial circles. Moreover, this behavioral 
pattern could go back to the 2nd millennium BC. 
 Therefore, European society was individualistic from an early age in the sense 
that it was the individuals rather than their extended families (clans) who made 
important decisions about marriage, property, and other personal matters. As a 
result, State institutions were superimposed on societies in which individuals 
already enjoyed considerable freedom from familistic obligations. For this reason, 
Fukuyama (2011, p.231) considers it appropriate to claim that “the social 
development in Europe preceded the political development”. 
The second force destroying familistic relationships as the basis of social 
organization was the European peculiar feudal vassalage system. For Bloch 
(1949), feudalism was formed “in the fiery furnace” of invasions and immense 
disorders, being a desperate self-defense response there off, that demanded new 
forms of articulation between isolated groups that were not related by 
familisticties. In other words, feudalism emerged as a non-familistic alternative of 
social organization. Familistic structures no longer provided adequate protection, 
to the extent that they were already actively undermined by the exogamous 
marriage rules defined by the Catholic Church. Thus, the essence of feudalism 
was the voluntary submission of one individual to another, not based on kin 
relationships, but on exchanging of protection for loyalty. 
Thus, as Fukuyama noted (2011), during the medieval period, before the 
formation of the centralized National States and centuries before the 
Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution, Western 
European societies had already become much more individualistic than any other 
society that ever existed. Therefore, a transformation that did not result from 
these significant modernizing changes, but on the contrary, it was an essential 
element explaining their emergence. As a result, the emerging capitalist economy 
had not to face the resistance of large, corporately organized familistic groups 
with substantial property to protect, as it happened in China or India, but 
instead, it advanced in societies where property routinely changed hands between 
strangers (non-relatives). 
 
 
The political/institutional factors 
  
 Another decisive element in explaining the European specificity was the 
fragmentation of power, a necessary condition to avoid the formation of despotic 
regimes. The fragmentation was due to geopolitical factors (regions and states in 
competition), as well as to the emergence of State independent institutions and 
organizations. Thus, the very emergence of centralized States in Western Europe 
occurred after or concomitantly with the emergence of the conditions for a less 
authoritarian political order that became progressively more democratic. 
As defined by Fukuyama (2011), a fully democratic political order occurs 
when the State is effective, but subject to the Rule of Law (a Constitution and 
an independent judiciary), creating Accountable Governments (in the face of 
parliaments, assemblies and other political bodies that represent broader sectors 
of the population). Although a despotic State may be effective, it is unpredictable 
due to personal inclinations, caprices, of the successive despots. Alternatively, as 
in the case of the precocious and highly despotic Chinese State, which was quite 
predictable in its aversion to changes in the status quo. There is no minimum 
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security and freedom necessary for individuals and innovative initiatives to 
thrive. 
 Similarly, for North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), the social order most 
compatible with the blossoming of individuals and initiatives is the Social Order 
of Open Access. Open access to the economic and political systems. Open access 
to the economic system serves to prevent the manipulation of economic interests 
by the political system. In turn, the open political system allows the group in 
power to be contested through prescribed constitutional means. All citizens have 
the right, defined impersonally (equality is impossible without impersonality), to 
form organizations without the consent of the State, which ensures non-violent 
competition in politics, economy, and in virtually any area of open access society. 
Along the same lines, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) consider the emergence of 
inclusive political institutions, which replaced previous extractive political 
institutions, as the fundamental cause of the great divergence in development 
between Europe and the rest of the world. For them, however, the relevant 
period of analysis starts at the end of the 17th century, with the Glorious 
Revolution in England. Until that moment, the existing social orders were closed, 
and extractive political institutions prevailed. 
 On the contrary, this paper is arguing that the constituent elements of a 
democratic political/social order evolved exceptionally and precociously well 
before the 17th century, leading to the formation of relatively open access 
polities, with a predominance of individualism in the social sphere and of State-
independent organizations and institutions. This exceptional evolution explains 
European technological, organizational, institutional, and cultural creativity. 
Capitalism, the Industrial Revolution, and Democratic Modernity were not 
developed in Europe by chance. They are the result of a unique evolutionary 
process.  This process started at the beginning of feudalism, between the 5th and 
10th centuries. Its apogee, between the 11th and 13th centuries, was driven by a 
sequence of institutional, organizational, and macro and micro technological 
innovations, which deeply transformed its nature, giving birth to capitalism and 
causing commercial, preindustrial and agricultural revolutions. The main actors 
that ensured these dynamics were feudal States, cities, the Church, monasteries, 
universities, and corporations. 
 The feudal States consolidated at the end of the 10th century competed and 
with the cities. Their leaders were kings who were also feudal lords, being only 
“primus inter pares." They were the suzerains of several manors, having vassals 
who, as a rule, had vassalage relationships with other lords simultaneously. 
Eventually, the vassals acquired full control of the land, which was passed on 
directly to the heirs. Therefore, the power of the feudal aristocracy limited the 
royal power, and differentiates itself into high and small (gentry) nobility, acting 
through representative assemblies.  
 On the other hand, the cities had an independent and innovative form of 
governance, the Commune. Alternating alliances with monarchies and feudal 
aristocracies, arming themselves, and being able to defeat even the Emperor, the 
cities played a decisive role in the medieval political order, which was unique in 
the history of civilizations. They came to form an internal frontier to the landed 
feudal estates that increased a lot the mobility of labor. Such greater mobility 
exerted a permanent evolutionary impact on the relations between masters and 
servants. From an economic point of economic view, the cities caused a decisive 
impact by engaging in international trade very early, creating a large market 
space that united Northern Europe (Baltic Sea) and Southern Europe 
(Mediterranean Sea) and Europe and Asia/North Africa.  
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 The Catholic Church, as an independent religious institution, was able to 
define a field of spiritual power prerogatives separated from temporal power, as 
well as to play a decisive role in defining and legitimizing a superior law under 
which everyone, including the monarch, was subjected. Linked to this institution, 
but having considerable autonomy, were monasteries and universities. 
Monasteries, although capable of acting directly in the political game of power, 
had their most notable role as innovation centers of all kinds, agricultural and 
industrial, acting as “proto-capitalist” enterprises. Universities were autonomous 
centers of thought and acted corporately; on the one hand, they had an 
unparalleled evolutionary impact in the political and philosophical debate; on the 
other hand, they had an impact on the legal order by training an entire category 
of legal experts who were at the origin of an independent and professional 
judiciary, a necessary condition to consolidate the “Rule of Law." 
 Finally, the craftsmen corporations, the Guilds. These professionals’ 
associations also performed a significant role in the political game, especially 
within the governance of cities in alliance with the Communes. They also played 
a decisive role in the development of industrial and commercial activities. The 
Guilds dignified labor, reflecting a change in the old mentality about its value, 
which used to be non-honorable in all civilizations. 
 
 
The peculiarity of the feudal states in Europe               
  
As shown above, the formation of the feudal states in Europe resulted from 
the effort to build a defensive system in the absence of tribal/familistic 
relationships – the vassalage system. Another key characteristic of feudal states 
was that its legitimacy heavily depended on the capacity of feudal kings to 
provide justice. They were nothing more than “primus inter pares” within a 
decentralized feudal order. They spent most of their time traveling through their 
realms, as this was the only way to assert their authority and maintain 
communication in a fragmented world of isolated villages and fiefdoms. One of 
the primary services the king could offer was to serve as a court of appeals to 
individuals who were dissatisfied with the rulings of the local ruler. Of course, it 
was in the kings’ interests to expand the jurisdiction of their courts. It increased 
their authority and prestige, besides being paid services. Itinerant royal courts 
had the advantage of being more impartial due to having fewer bonds with 
litigants than the local lords. They also presented procedural advantages, such as 
the ability to compel citizens to serve as jurors and, over time, they began to 
enjoy economies of scale and scope. The administration of justice requires 
specialized work performed by better trained personnel. 
It is important to note that it was not a simple matter of administrating 
justice, something that was the responsibility of the rulers of any civilization but 
administrating it under the “Rule of Law." The Law consists of a body of 
abstract rules responsible for the cohesion of a given community. In premodern 
societies, the Law was supposed to originate from an authority superior to any 
human legislator, whether it was divine authority, an immemorial custom, or 
nature. The Legislation, in turn, corresponds to what is now called a positive law, 
being the responsibility of the political power, i.e., the responsibility of the king, 
warlord, president or legislature to elaborate and enforce new rules based on a 
combination of power and authority. The “Rule of Law” only exists when a 
preexisting body of laws (based on a religious text or a constitution as in the 
Modern States) is sovereign regarding the legislation, thus limiting the rulers' 
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power. Law and Legislation currently correspond to the distinction between 
constitutional laws and ordinary laws. Therefore, the prevalence of the Rule of 
Law implies a limitation to the power of the State. 
However, the conditions for the proper functioning of the Rule of Law go 
beyond institutional or procedural aspects: the Law must be perceived as fair, 
and no exceptions in its application can exist. The kings and the seigneurial 
barons could not be above the law, which, ultimately, had its value derived from 
a religious sanction. Therefore, in its more profound sense, the Rule of Law 
means that there is society's consensus that its laws are fair, and that they must 
preexist and regulate the behavior of whoever is the ruler at any moment. The 
Law is sovereign and not the ruler. The legitimacy of the ruler depends on the 
Law. In the past, the primary source of fair laws outside the political order 
sphere was religion. However, for these laws to be respected by the rulers, the 
religious authority had to be asserted independently from the political authority, 
as was the case with the Catholic church. 
 
 
The role of an independent religious organization 
  
 As Fukuyama (2011) showed, religion did not reflect a sociocultural 
consensus in China but usually served as a source of social protest. The Chinese 
State has never recognized any religious source of authority as superior to its own 
and has always easily controlled every religious class that ever existed. Therefore, 
there has never been a Rule of Law based on religious authority in China. In its 
legalistic tradition, all the laws were considered positive laws, i.e., the Law was 
whatever the Emperor decreed. 
In India, the situation was completely different. Brahmanism, which 
developed concurrently to the formation of the Indian states, was able to 
subordinate the political/warrior class to the priestly class. The Law had strong 
roots in religion, and there was no separate secular lawmaking field. However, the 
priestly class (Brahmin) as not organized within a church in a hierarchical way as 
in the West. This class acted in a fragmented way, divided into different for 
subclasses defined by the functions performed (those conducting the rites of the 
investiture of kings, those conducting funerals, and the likes. They never 
subordinated themselves to the State, nor became officials, but were incapable of 
collective action through an institutional hierarchy. In the domain of Islamic 
Civilization, there was a Rule of Law based on religious authority, but not a 
religious institution independent of the State. There was a greater law of divine 
origin clearly expressed in the Qur'an, which gave origin to a codified body of 
laws – the Shariah. The legitimacy of the temporal power was conditional for the 
application of Islamic law. As a result, religious and secular powers fused into 
theocratic political orders. 
In Western Europe, the Rule of Law was institutionalized to a much greater 
extent. In addition to the specificities of feudal states, the fundamental 
explanatory factor for this difference was the presence of a religious institution 
that achieved a degree of autonomy and influence unparalleled by the religious 
institutions in other civilizations. After the fall of the Roman Empire and the 
subsequent weakening of political power, the Catholic Church was able to assert 
its independence. However, such independence started to erode as feudal political 
orders began consolidating; the appointment of bishops and even popes became a 
common prerogative of local and regional political powers, as well as of the 
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Emperor himself. However, by the end of the 11th century, the Church was able 
to, once again, incisively assert its independence from secular powers. 
For Fukuyama (2011), this ability undoubtedly depended on the energy, 
tenacity, and determination of a man like Hildebrand, a monk who became Pope 
in 1073 under the name of Gregory VII. He was determined to end the corruption 
and rent seeking that this system of appointments promoted, reinforced by the 
fact that priests could marry and bequeath to their children properties that 
should belong to the Church. Compulsory celibacy solved this last problem. To 
solve the first one, he directly attacked the right of secular powers to appoint 
bishops and priests, making it an exclusive prerogative to the Church itself. 
Moreover, he advocated the legal supremacy of the popes over all Christians, 
including the Emperor (who could be deposed). 
Emperor Henry IV’s reaction was to attempt deposing the Pope, who 
retaliated by excommunicating him. The excommunication made the Emperor 
undergo a barefoot walk during the winter of 1077, in a historical episode, to 
humbly ask Gregory VII for his forgiveness while he was waiting for him in the 
fortress of Canossa (north of Italy). However, this conflict over the “right of 
investiture” will only end in 1122, after many back and forth arguments (Gregory 
VII died in exile in 1085) with the Concordat of Worms, through which the 
emperor Henry V, son of Henry IV, recognized the Church’s right over the 
investiture (appointments); the Church, in turn, recognized the Emperor’s right 
over several temporal matters. The Church’s ability to sustain the independence 
policy started by Gregory VII and to stand as an autonomous political power 
depended certainly on the peculiar political fragmentation of Western Europe. It 
allowed the Church to seek protection by playing with different rivals. The kings 
of the Norman kingdom in Sicily played a decisive role in supporting the Church 
against Henry IV and his son Henry V, emperors of the Holy Roman Empire.  
For Fukuyama (2011), the investiture contest, in addition to contributing to 
consolidating the Church as an institution with autonomous political power, as 
well as an organization of high complexity and capacity for adaptation, had, as a 
consequence a clear cut separation between the realms of temporal and spiritual 
powers, laying the foundations for the emergence and consolidation of the secular 
State. Finally, this conflict was essential for the development of both the Law 
and the Rule of Law in Europe. For the development of the Law to the extent 
that this conflict stimulated the Church's efforts to gain legitimacy through the 
formulation of a regular legal canon, the Canon Law and for the development of 
the Rule of Law, as the Church was able to create a separate and well 
institutionalized domain of spiritual authority with universal jurisdiction. 
 
  
The universities 
  
Searching for sources of law that would serve to strengthen the claim of 
universal jurisdiction in some issues, Gregory VII’s successors rediscovered the 
Codex Justinianus (Justinian’s Code) at the end of the 11th century. From this 
moment on, this Code became and remained until today, the basis of civil laws 
practiced throughout continental Europe and in countries that were colonized or 
influenced by it. The strength of this revival of Roman law mostly resulted from 
the establishment of Law studies programs on new institutional bases with the 
“invention” of the University. The origins of universities are in the schools of the 
Cathedrals, beginning in Bologna in 1088. The fundamental difference between 
the University and the other types of higher education institutions in Europe and 
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other societies lied in the freedom and autonomy for research and debate. All 
levels of power granted such freedom and autonomy. In 1158, Emperor Frederick 
I (also known as Barbarossa) promulgated an “Authentica Habita” (a university’s 
organic law) that transformed the University of Bologna into a “city-state." The 
municipalities competed for having the privilege to host a University. The papacy 
defended the universities’ autonomy over the established powers and respected 
their research agendas, even when they contradicted the Church's doctrines or 
guidelines.   
 Discussing the fact that universities openly flouted the Church’s restrictions 
on the dissection of corpses, Schachner (1938, p.3) noted that: 
“The university was the darling, the spoiled child of the Papacy and the 
Empire, of king and municipality alike. Privileges were showered on the proud 
Universities in a continuous golden stream; privileges that had no counterpart, 
then, before, or since. Not even the sacred hierarchies of the Church had quite 
the exemptions of the poorest begging scholar who could claim protection of a 
University. Municipalities competed violently for the honor of housing one within 
their walls; kings wrote siren letters to entice discontented groups of scholars 
from the domains of their rivals; Popes intervened with menacing language to 
compel royalty to respect the inviolability of this beloved institution.” 
The new Law curriculum at the University of Bologna attracted students from 
all over Europe. Soon, the other universities began to compete strongly in this 
field, notably the University of Paris. Thus, the sophisticated legal system of 
Justinian’s Code became the model for the legal systems in several regions. After 
an initial period of reconstruction and reproduction of Roman law, generations of 
“scholars” went further in the search for the intellectual foundations of Law, 
reaching the Greek philosophers. Classical philosophers e Aristotle thought that 
the legal tradition received had to be submitted to human reason and confronted 
with more universal standards of truth. In this sense, the rediscovery of the 
classical philosophical tradition in European universities, especially by the work 
of Saint Thomas Aquinas at the University of Paris, encouraged successive 
generations of legal commentators to go further than the mechanical reproduction 
of an existing body of laws, rationally reflecting on the sources of law and how 
they could be applied in new situations. 
 A separate class of legal experts emerged from universities; they acted 
similarly to the members of a guild in perfecting their “art." Over time, both 
religious and lay authorities understood that they had to rely on the knowledge 
of legal experts when making decisions, especially in the commercial sphere where 
contracts and property rights were critical. 
Starting from the Gregorian reform, the Church gradually acquires a State 
structure, having its legislation – the Canon Law – and a professional 
bureaucracy like the Chinese’s developed centuries before. The Gregorian reform 
offered not only a bureaucratic and legal model for the new centralized States 
that were starting to emerge in Europe but also stimulated the emergence of 
several new legal forms related to different domains – the fiefdom, the city, long-
distance trade –, which motivated the competition between jurisdictions. The rise 
of the independent cities was particularly crucial for the development of 
commercial law due to their dependence on foreign trade. Therefore, as noted by 
Fukuyama (2011), the Rule of Law existed before the political power was 
concentrated in the hands of centralized governments. 
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The monastic orders 
  
 Monasteries had a pioneering role in the systematic search for innovations of 
all kinds, especially the monastic order of Citeaux. As seen, this order won the 
“socio-ideological” battle in favor of the idea that work is dignifying to man. The 
new monastic orders became "farming models." They also transformed many of 
their monasteries into models for solving non-agricultural technical problems, 
from reinforcing and maintaining dikes in the Netherlands to well drilling and 
bridges construction techniques and various industrial activities that eventually 
became specialties of each monastery. The monasteries evolved to become proto 
capitalist enterprises, where the work was valued, but not heavy and repetitive. 
Creative work was the most valued, including that of the engineers who invented 
ways to make it less painful. 
 A document from the 13th century on the role of hydraulic energy in the 
mechanization of work in the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux gives a 
remarkably clear idea of the level of mechanization attained and the enthusiasm 
for its adoption: 
 “A branch of the river, crossing the numerous workshops of the Abbey, makes 
itself felt everywhere by the services it provides […] the river is first launched 
with impetuosity on the mill, where it becomes very agitated and writhes, both 
to grind the grain under the weight of grinding stones, as well as to stir the sieve 
separating the flour from the straw. Then, it goes to the next compartment; it 
fills the boiler and surrenders itself to the fire that cooks it to prepare the beer of 
the monks if the harvest of grapes was not good. The river does not give up. The 
cloth pressing mills call it in turn. The river that was busy preparing the monks’ 
food, now thinks about their vestments. It does not refuse anything that it is 
asked for. It raises or lowers these heavy pestles and hammers, or rather, these 
wooden feet, thus sparing the monks from great fatigues […] how many horses 
would be exhausted, how many men would fatigue their arms in this work made 
for us by this graceful river, to which we owe our garments and our food. When 
it spins so many fast wheels, it comes out foaming as it were ground. When it 
leaves, it enters the tannery, where it prepares the leather necessary for the 
monks’ shoes; it shows both activity and care, for it divides himself into 
numerous small arms to visit different services, diligently searching everywhere 
for those in need of its services, whether it was to cook, tan, break, wet, wash or 
grind, never refusing to offer its services. Finally, to complete its work, it takes 
the filth away, leaving everything clean”. 
  
 
The independent cities 
  
The distinctively unique character of the medieval towns in Western Europe 
resulted from a process that began with the Italian port cities on the Adriatic 
coast and was extended inland under their leadership. According to Lopez (1976), 
these cities, as was common to all cities, kept vassalage links with more than one 
lord to remain relatively independent. However, the difference is that these port 
cities, notably Venice and Amalfi, had connections with the Byzantine Empire, 
which may explain the fact that their elites – including those that were 
landowners –actively took part in maritime trade from an early stage. Venice was 
politically independent but had the Byzantine Emperor as the city’s lord, 
providing him naval support, as well as intermediating the exchanges with the 
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Western Empire (Carolingian). Venice also maintained commercial relations with 
the Islamic world in the Middle East and North Africa. A thriving commercial 
triangle: Eastern luxury goods (mainly spices, silk, and jewels) and Western 
commodities (iron, wood, naval supplies, and slaves), as well as “Venetian” goods 
(salt from their lagoons and glass). The position of Amalfi was similar, changing 
only the types of goods produced locally: great quantities of locally produced 
textiles and olive oil. However, it was not as politically independent as Venice 
due to not having the protection of the sea against the surrounding feudal lords. 
 As the progress of Venice and Amalfi was shifting the center of naval and 
economic power to the Italian peninsula, two ports on the other side joined them, 
Genoa and Pisa. Conjointly, these cities managed to expel the Muslims from 
Corsica and Sardinia, putting an end to the looting and devastation they used to 
cause. In these cities, virtually all the inhabitants were free men and participated 
in some way in municipal assemblies and minor administrative activities. The 
merchants of these cities served in the army together with landlords having 
similar incomes; with all the citizens, they were responsible for the defense of the 
city walls. 
The younger sons of the surrounding feudal nobility found in the Italian cities 
an economic opportunity in commerce, as well as the opportunity to perform the 
activity they trained for their entire lives: the military combat, frequently facing 
pirates, “infidels”, competing cities and in the “opening” of markets. Merchants 
and the nobility merged, including literally through marriage: from the 12th 
century onwards, they became part of the category known as “magnates”, who 
distinguished themselves from the rest of the population by their level of income 
and not by titles of nobility. For this reason, it was comparatively easier for the 
urban population to depose or buy the city’s feudal lord and establish their 
communal government under the magnate’s leadership, but with the 
participation of all citizens in varying degrees. 
 Inland cities had much more difficult to conquer their independence from the 
feudal lords, whose heavy cavalry was initially superior to the forces of the 
bourgeoisie, composed by spearmen phalanxes supported by crossbowmen. Over 
time, the accumulation of military capacity allowed them to force local lords to 
become members of the Communes as the only alternative to total ruin. In 1176, 
the Lombard League defeated in Legnano the supreme lord of Italy, the Emperor 
Frederick Barbarossa, thereby conquering complete independence; after the 
defeat, their vassalage bond with the Emperor became just nominal. Shortly 
after, the cities of Tuscany reached the same status without having to fight. In 
the 12th century, the Italian communes had essentially become “merchant 
governments, by merchants and for merchants” (Lopez, RS 1976). 
As noted by Lopez (1976), the urban commercial revolution in medieval 
Europe allowed, in an unprecedented way in the history of civilizations, the 
liberation of the agricultural surplus for investments in the business, as well as 
allowing more flexible credit operations. The substantial expansion of credit was 
the great lubricant of this revolution in the context of inflation and shortage of 
currencies. This expansion was achieved through new partnership formulas and 
other arrangements for sharing risks and profits. Innovations which resulted, 
according to Lopez (1976, post.951), from the Church's insistence that loans were 
sinful unless they were granted without interest and in the spirit of charity, 
following the same attitude of cooperation that involved the men of all classes in 
the political struggle that eventually led to the rise of the independent 
Communes. Commercial contract development was as crucial in the history of 
trade as that of tools and techniques in the history of agriculture.  
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 Banking and financial development were practically a byproduct of the 
expansion of international trade. What local deposit bankers could not do – as 
they had a limited amount of capital, were regulated by municipalities, and were 
liable to be sued by ecclesiastical courts for usury – was far easier for merchants 
engaged in international trade. Foreign operations and the contractual 
innovations introduced by it, allowed them to legally engage in the same credit 
operations in connection with their commercial activities. In essence, they 
accepted interest bearing deposits, subsequently extending larger interest loans 
without the risk of being condemned by the Church. They fully benefited from 
innovative instruments such as the bills of exchange to charge the interest rates 
they wanted. These bills consisted of contracts in which one party received an 
advance in local currency from another and promised to pay it back in another 
currency elsewhere. The primary purpose of this type of contract was to provide 
the second part of the money needed overseas, saving it from the risk and cost of 
traveling with local money. This scheme entitled the first party to charge for 
funds transference and currency exchange services. Given that a certain period 
elapsed between the advance in local currency and payment in foreign currency, 
the transaction involved a loan from the second part to the first, whereby the 
first part paid an interest hidden in the exchange rate. 
The Commenda was another contractual innovation of extreme importance; it 
was the closest medieval antecedent to the concept of the modern corporation 
and, like many others, involved some form of credit. In its simplest form, a 
merchant from one city advances capital to another who is willing to travel to 
conduct business, the former takes the risks of capital and is entitled to ¾ of the 
profits; the last assumes the risks of the work, being the only one responsible for 
the commercial transactions performed and gets ¼ of the profits. The same 
merchant who lends money to another also does the reverse, receiving capital 
from other traders to invest in business expeditions. In the beginning, in the first 
contracts, accountability was demanded to be supported with some proof for the 
profits obtained; however, over time, the businesses were made from mutual 
trust. Eventually, commercial activities become routine, and competition reduced 
the profit rate. More experienced traders could run their business through 
employees and commercial agents, without having to travel. By the beginning of 
the 14th century in Italy, the average interest rate on commercial loans had 
fallen to 8-12%. In Germany, the legal rate was still 43% (in Nuremberg).  
 During the 13th century, the gravity center of the Mediterranean definitively 
moved to the “big four” of Central and Northern Italy: Venice, Milan, Florence 
and Genova. Only the Catalan traders were able to compete with the Italians, 
and at the beginning of the 14th century in the rest of the Mediterranean basin, 
they controlled an essential part of the long-distance international trade. In the 
North, the end of the invasions and the expansion agricultural from the 10th 
century on, allowed several German cities to develop their own local and long-
distance commerce (in the Baltic) and, as in Italy, also allowed them to challenge 
the emperor’s and his vassals’ authority to build their own commercial and 
colonial empire eventually. The main products traded in the Northern 
Mediterranean were fiber, grains, wood, resins, tar, honey, wax, skins, precious 
and semiprecious metals, wool, salt, and salted herring. In the Western corner of 
the Baltic sea, the British and Dutch managed to control the trade, but many 
commodities of the Atlantic regions, such as Gascon wine and Basque iron, were 
traded by local merchants; everyone performed short-haul cabotage. Local 
merchants took virtually all the production from inland regions that were far 
from the sea to the main centers, where the Italian merchants predominated. 
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 The fairs of Champagne eclipsed all others from the end of the 12th century 
until the beginning of the 14th century. These fairs successfully innovated by 
operating in rotation between the cities of the region throughout the year. They 
worked mainly as centers to exchange money and goods for merchants who 
converged there from all over Europe and were not interested in local businesses. 
The goods were presented as samples at most, and credit instruments almost 
entirely replaced the currency. The fairs declined when the Italians began to go 
directly to the ports of the North Sea with their ships, establishing permanent 
offices there. 
In the North-South-Orient (the Levant) commercial axis, through Italy, the 
goods from the South came in two groups of high-value products: raw materials, 
like spices (spices, especially pepper which was also a food preservative) and 
medicinal products, fabric paints, raw silk, precious stones, and ivory; from the 
North, initially came non-precious metals and wood, followed by a growing and 
varied list of industrial products (glass, weapons and other iron goods and, above 
all, linen and wool fabrics). 
 Lopez (1976, p.107) considers that “perhaps the most striking byproduct of 
commercial trade’s growing maturity was the consolidation of colonies and the 
increasing reliance of international traders on quasi-sedentary agents abroad." 
That was not a byproduct, but a decisive factor pushing the commercial 
expansion. The reliability of such a scheme, in turn, was the result of two 
organizational/institutional innovations: The Commune and the community 
responsibility system. These two innovations generated peculiar State governance 
in the absence of centralized territorial states, being relatively democratic, 
capable of protecting the property rights, as well as of providing two essential 
conditions for the expansion of the merchants’ commercial activities: the 
possibility of hiring agents abroad without being deceived (the principal agent 
problem) and the protection against predatory rulers of foreign jurisdictions. 
 The Commune was a temporary voluntary sworn association, led by consuls 
elected for a limited period by a parliament composed of all citizens with "full 
rights." Such organizations were a self-governing community that occupied a gray 
area between the State and the communities. A Commune was like a community 
insofar as characterized by intra-community personal familiarity, but also as a 
State as it had a geographically localized monopoly of the legal use of coercive 
power. 
 The community responsibility system involved the association between 
municipalities and trade Guilds. This system managed to coordinate the 
collective action of a group of interests, such as the merchants of a city, 
preventing the group’s internal conflicts and, at the same time, allowing the 
establishment of long-distance commercial activities between economic agents 
unrelated by kinship and with property rights secured vis-à-vis potentially 
predatory states. In the community responsibility system, the court of a 
Commune held all members of another Commune accountable for the damage 
caused to one of its members. If the deceiver’s Commune refused to compensate 
the deceived agent, the Commune court of the deceived individual would order 
the confiscation of the property of all the members of the deceiver’s Commune to 
compensate the deceived agent. The only way for the deceiver’s Commune to 
avoid compensation would be to have no business whatsoever with the Commune 
of the deceived agent. However, this could be very costly. Therefore, the most 
sensible behavior of the court of a Commune was to dispense impartial justice by 
punishing its fraudulent member. This system transformed Communes into 
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perpetual life organizations, which internalized the cost of a fraud performed by 
any of its members against members of another community (see Greif, A.2006). 
 Therefore, the binomial Guild-Commune solved the problem of impersonal 
exchanges in premodern Europe, which are characterized by the separation of 
quid and quo through jurisdictional boundaries, through a self-enforcing 
institution. A private order based on institutions capable of enforcing the rules 
they created was the hallmark of the medieval trade expansion. An order 
resulting from the coordinated efforts of many individuals unrelated by kinship 
bonds. The social structures created through these efforts were self-governed and 
based on the mutual interests of their participants. They were self-governed as 
their members participated in the creation of the rules to govern their activities, 
which legitimated them. In this sense, Greif (2006) considers that the traditional 
understanding that the emergence of centralized states was a precondition for the 
expansion of markets should be reviewed in the light of the history of the 
community responsibility system. 
 
 
Capital accumulation and labor productivity 
  
 The Commercial Revolution, promoted by the independent cities, caused a 
substantial impact on the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, which were 
already evolving through the introduction of several innovations. 
  
 
A preindustrial revolution  
  
 The significant enlargement of the commercial space that was made possible 
by the community responsibility system, commercially uniting the whole 
European area, in addition to the international trade with the East and North 
Africa, significantly increased the productivity system by allowing regional 
specializations. The productive process itself underwent continuous changes, 
which increased labor productivity. Initially, the Guilds, corporate craft 
organizations (an important institutional innovation) played a central role in the 
organization of the labor process and the improvement of production methods. 
Their origin lied, like that of their commercial counterparts, in the mutual aid 
confraternities with their respective patron saints, which characterized the 
evolving social life in the cities. The work in Craft Corporations was 
hierarchically structured, from the apprentices to the master, but mobility 
existed through talent and dedication. The corporation established the product 
quality levels and the fair price to ensure the adequate remuneration of the entire 
hierarchy of artisans. Under this form of organization, the craftsmanship quality 
of the works reached very high levels, as can be witnessed in the Dijon’s Musée 
de l’Outil, with its vast collection of specialized tools of all kinds for the most 
perfected finishes. 
 The expansion of markets brought by the Commercial Revolution eventually 
led to the end of the craft corporations. From the outside through the “putting 
out” system: the innovators took the craft production to rural villages, far from 
the Guilds’ jurisdiction. From within each workshop, as the superior productivity 
made possible by the fragmentation of the artisanal work into specialized 
operations of the working process began to impose itself in more dynamic sectors 
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like the textile: the production of one piece of cloth went through 26 different 
operations, each performed by a skilled worker (Gimpel, J.1975).      
 For Lopez (1976), while the cotton based textile industry first started the 
Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, the wool based textile industry began 
the medieval Pre-Industrial Revolution in the 12th century. The first reason for 
that: the production process of textiles was initially divided into specialized 
operations run by different Guilds but eventually integrated into a single 
management unit. Each operation could be accelerated by relatively simple 
innovations – the pedal weaver replacing manual weavers and spinning wheels 
replacing hand spindles. The second reason was that the characteristics of both 
raw materials and finished products regarding the transportation costs allowed 
for a concentration of production in the most desirable places in terms of the 
availability of labor and entrepreneurial capacity, as was the case of the 
Netherlands in particular. The silk industry in Italy was not far behind the wool 
industry in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the production of linen fabrics had 
equal importance, especially for lingerie, with Switzerland and German Rhine 
valley becoming the main producing centers. Fustian (piquet), a new and cheaper 
textile product, was developed from a mixture of cotton and wool. Around 1200, 
a piece of piquet cost a twentieth of a piece of good quality wool. In short, 
Medieval textile output based on putting out system came close to the English 
textile industry on the eve of the Industrial Revolution. 
              
 
Agricultural expansion and labor productivity 
 
 The dynamics of innovation in the agricultural sector caused a decisive 
evolutionary impact on a mostly rural society. Feudal rurality was shaped by the 
long centuries of disturbance and violence of the High Middle Ages ever since the 
fall of the Roman Empire. Regarding agricultural systems, the violence led to the 
abandonment of shifting agriculture: the populations settled around a warrior 
lord for protection. The ecological conditions for permanent agriculture are 
radically different from those for shifting agriculture (slash-and-burn). In a forest 
environment, shifting agriculture mainly consists of preparing the field of culture 
by burning part of the forest. The fire cleans the land, eliminating many harmful 
parasites and microorganisms, and fertilizing the soil through the ashes that 
contain the mineral elements left over after the burning of the forest’s organic 
matter. Then, the soil is cultivated during a few years. 
Once exhausted, it must be abandoned for a period long enough for the forest 
to recover. This period of forest recovery varied depending on the climate; in the 
tropics, it occurs faster than in the Northern regions. In Northern Europe, this 
period seems to have varied between 30 and 35 years. If the necessary recovery 
period is respected, this cropping system is perfectly balanced from the ecological 
point of view and can go on for centuries without degrading the soil or the forest. 
In this cultivation system, labor productivity is relatively high, being 
undoubtedly superior to the one obtained from the system of permanent culture 
that replaced it. This difference is mainly due to lower labor costs of soil 
preparation and weed control. 
The structural conditions of a soil recently covered by the forest allow it to be 
sown immediately after burning it, a method that is currently known as no-tillage 
or minimum tillage, sparing the preparation labor. Further, weeds do not invade 
forest clearings. Thus, in forested lands, the farmer uses the fire only once to 
have the soil ready for cultivation. Furthermore, there are indications that the 
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yields from slash-and-burn agriculture were higher than those obtained from 
permanent cropping systems, thanks to the mineral nutrients present in the 
ashes. In a permanent open field, in addition to a higher labor cost to maintain 
soil fertility, there was the extremely high cost of controlling weeds. An arduous 
work of mechanical control is necessary to prepare an area invaded by weeds. As 
Sigaut (1975, p.167) observed, “in the past, the greatest enemy of the farmer were 
not the trees, but the grass [weeds]." Thus, it would be economically 
incomprehensible for farmers to abandon the system of shifting cultivation in 
favor of permanent agriculture if something had not coerced them to do so. 
The system of permanent agriculture that replaced the shifting system in 
Northern Europe became known as the two-year rotation system. The invention 
of the heavy plow represented a decisive leap. Primarily conceived as an 
instrument of weed control, it represented the first laborsaving instrument for the 
field operations in the history of agriculture. In this new permanent culture 
system, the plot was divided into two parts, and one remained in “fallow”, to be 
sowed in the next season. This period of “fallow” was confused by many authors 
as a period necessary for the soil recover its fertility, as in the shift cultivation 
mode except by the length of the fallow period. However, as pointed out by 
Sigaut (1977), this idea goes against the very etymological meaning of the French 
word “jachère” for fallow, which means “to work the land” (to control weeds). 
Regarding the fertilization of the crops, this represented a significant problem 
to be solved. In the impossibility of having exogenous sources of nutrients on a 
significant scale, the fertilization techniques were based on the transfer of organic 
matter from the surrounding land to the field under permanent cultivation. This 
transference was done in two ways: either directly, through the collection of 
vegetation (étrepage), or indirectly, through the intestines of animals. The 
shortage of forage for the animals available in the fallow plots (crop residues, cut 
weeds) forced the peasants to complete the cattle feeding by releasing it into the 
surrounding natural forests and pastures and bringing it back at night to the 
crop fields (“Parcage de nuit”) to take advantage of their nocturnal dejections. 
The losses of mineral elements were high, especially of nitrogen. 
 
 
Dynamics of technical change 
 
The invention of the heavy plow around the 8th century was a technological 
response to a radical change in the agroecological conditions caused by the 
change from shifting agriculture to permanent agriculture. However, its fully 
effective use was limited when pulled by oxen. Horses are a much better option 
for being faster, although weaker. However, due to the prevailing harnessing 
system, horses could not be used in full capacity. The invention of the “horse 
collar”, solved the problem displacing the point of support from the horse’s neck 
to the chest (or “shoulders”), alleviating the pressure over the animal's jugular. In 
this sense, the old harnessing system was, literally, a real “bottleneck” that 
prevented more efficient use of the new equipment. 
White (1962) considers that these combined inventions – the heavy plow and 
the horse collar – led to an agricultural revolution: replacing the biennial rotation 
system by the triennial rotation system. The land plot will be divided into three 
parts: one, as usual, to be sown with a winter cereal (wheat or rye) at the end of 
autumn;  another remained in “fallow”; and, the third, and here is the novelty, to 
be sown during early spring with a less important cereal to fed humans (oats, 
barley), but also less demanding from the soil nutrients than wheat. Thus, 
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instead of producing in only half of the soil surface each year using the biennial 
rotation system, the farmer used two thirds of the total area in the triennial 
rotation system, representing an increase of 34% of the cultivated surface for the 
same amount of work. 
For the agricultural calendar, these two systems present different working 
processes. For the old biennial system there were three fazes: sowing winter 
cereal, controlling weeds in the fallow plot, and harvesting. For the new triennial 
system there will be five fazes: sowing winter cereal, controlling weeds in the 
fallow plot, sowing spring cereals crop, and two harvests. For this new calendar 
of agricultural work to be feasible, the field preparation for planting the spring 
crop had to be fast; otherwise, there would not be enough time for the grains to 
mature by the end of the summer. The work is better distributed throughout the 
agricultural calendar in the new system and more precise and intensive, requiring 
a set of faster and more powerful soil preparation instruments, which could only 
be obtained by using the horse as a traction animal. It took centuries for the full 
spread of the new rotation system in the 13th century. According to White 
(1962), initially, the established agrarian interests opposed its introduction. 
However, the Viking invasions of the 9th and 10th centuries left large areas 
depopulated, which facilitated the adoption of the new system. Then, the stimuli 
from the favorable climate change that occurred by the end of the millennium 
and the substantial trade expansion contributed to its spreading.  
It is important to note that if it was not possible to adopt the triennial 
rotation system without horses as heavy-duty animals, however, the reverse was 
also true, i.e., the significant expansion of the equine herd was only possible 
because of it. The reason for that lies in the fact that horses are not ruminants; 
their food must be supplemented with cereals. Under the biennial rotation 
system, grain production was not large enough to feed humans and horses. The 
spring crop from the triennial system, especially oats, was used almost exclusively 
to feed horses. Moreover, the expansion of the equine herd played a decisive role 
in the development of Europe. 
For starters, it stimulated several manufacturing activities to produce the 
equipment and materials necessary to use the horse efficiently. Among these 
activities was metallurgy, thanks mainly to horseshoes making: without them, the 
intensive use of horses would become practically unfeasible. Another factor of 
significant impact was the use of horses in the transport system, replacing the 
slow oxen and allowing the emergence of a whole range of types of transport 
equipment (carts, wagons, carriages, eking etc.) destined to multiple and varied 
tasks. The improvement of transport capacity, caused multiple positive impacts, 
starting with those in the agricultural production system itself as, for instance, it 
made it possible a more systematic application of soil correctives, such as 
limestone and some types of natural chemical fertilizers. 
Moreover, as Mazoyer (1977, p. 31) pointed, without the transport of several 
tons of fodder, straw, and manure per big animal head per year, housing and 
feeding the cattle during the winter would not be possible. That was a decisive 
step to make the production of composted organic fertilizers possible. As 
mentioned above, the fertilization method until that moment consisted of the 
transfer of organic matter, directly or indirectly, from the surrounding forests and 
fields to the cropland. The nutrient losses (nitrogen) were high. Using lairage, 
taking full advantage of the animals’ droppings became possible, composting 
them to avoid nutrient losses, especially of nitrogen. As a result, the yields per 
hectare doubled over time, and when compounded to the expansion of a third of 
the cultivated area with the triennial system resulted in a very significant 
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increase in labor productivity. The revolution in the transport caused by horses 
had even an impact on the geographic distribution of the population, leading to a 
“villagization” process: better transportation allowed the peasants to live in 
villages and go every day to their crop fields. The defense of farming communities 
became easier as the population could concentrate in villages around a church 
that served as the “house of God and the shelter of men” (as a meeting place, 
refuge, and even as a barn in cases of exceptional crops) (Bloch,M.1976). The 
socioeconomic, cultural, and psychological impacts of this process cannot be 
overestimated. 
In short, from the invention of the plow, a whole chain of innovations and 
improvements can be traced, which developed the infrastructure and the 
transport capacity of the collectivity, increasing its potential for capital 
accumulation and giving rise to what Mazoyer (1977) called a “culture d'attelage” 
(harnessing culture). Braudel (1979) points out, precisely, the extensive use of 
horses for human and cargo transportation as one of the outstanding features of 
the dynamism of European civilization, which stands in stark contrast to the 
superhuman effort required by the transport on the backs of men used massively 
in other great civilizations like the Chinese and the Hindu. Therefore, the 
increase of the equine herd represents a better form of, literally, accumulation of 
capital that is qualitatively distinct from the accumulation based on other types 
of herds. 
This type of technological path is a recurring phenomenon in the history of 
technical progress, as shown by Rosenberg (1982). As a rule, techniques are not 
isolated from one another but articulated in a coherent set, so, as one of its 
components changes, the technological system become imbalanced what, in turn, 
induces the emergence of new techniques. It can be said so that the movement 
towards the triennial rotation system was not a result of the demographic 
pressure, as was supposed by many scholars and its generalization raised the 
overall productivity of agricultural labor. The new triennial rotation system 
required no more workers than those already available; it required adequate 
equipment to work on the soil more quickly. The new mouths to feed were not 
only those of men, but especially those of horses, these fantastic means of work, 
transportation, and fearsome weapons of war. 
The diffusion of this set of innovations provided the peasants with a highly 
satisfactory daily food ration, which generally included meat. Thus, it is essential 
to note that the still prevailing idea, one can say “popular," that the more we go 
back in time towards the Middle Ages, the deeper the misery, is entirely false. As 
Braudel (1979, v.I, p.163) observes, the truth is the opposite. The peasantry’s 
living conditions began to deteriorate at the end of the 13th century due to the 
exhaustion of the agricultural frontier, resulting in almost complete deforestation 
and aggravated by a new climatic change, this time unfavorable. The privilege of 
“l'Europe carnivore” (carnivorous Europe), according to Braudel’s expression, was 
only reestablished (for the peasants) with the generalization of the Norfolk four 
course system over the 18th and 19th centuries. 
 
 
Capital accumulation in agriculture and capitalism 
 
In addition to the transformative impacts inherent to the type of capital 
accumulation brought by innovations in feudal agriculture, this accumulation 
connects with the manufacturing and commercial expansion in the existing 
institutional/organizational context. The commercial revolution started by the 
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Italian cities in the 9th century would not have had the amplitude it had without 
an equivalent response from the feudal agrarian world. This response implied the 
progressive reduction of serfdom relationships between peasants and masters in 
favor of non-servile contractual forms, which always coexisted with the serfdom 
system but that eventually assumed a preponderant role. 
Vilar (1975) observes that the vast international trade only became 
widespread in the 11th century – when this technological, socioeconomic, and 
institutional development reached its maturity in terms of production capacity. 
The international trade, in turn, stimulated the growth of local production and 
the subsequent substitution of urban handicrafts for rural handicrafts. The 
capital accumulation resulting from the increase of labor productivity has very 
different dynamic effects when compared to the capital accumulation resulting 
just from population growth. The struggle between servants and masters to 
appropriate the growing agricultural surplus intensified, and the process of social 
differentiation of the peasantry stimulated, generating a class of agrarian 
capitalists. The commercial development further impacts the relationship between 
landlords and serfs as the increasing quantity and diversity of commodities 
available for the landlords induces a transition from payments in labor or 
products to payments in money. Landlords also began depending more and more 
on credit, which accelerated their downfall. The development of cities also 
accelerated the dissolution of the system, since it increases the bargaining power 
of servants vis-à-vis the landlords by offering them shelter and labor alternatives. 
As Kula (1977) stated, the “coefficient of practicable oppression” is reduced for 
the benefit of the serfs.  
It must be kept in mind the fact that European feudalism evolved most of the 
time in the context of labor shortage, which was counterbalanced by the scarcity 
of military labor until the 10th century: the situation of extreme insecurity forced 
the peasants to place themselves under the protection of a warlord. When the 
significant invasions ceased in the 11th century, the agricultural frontier opened 
again. Therefore, the value of military labor fell, and the value of agricultural 
labor increased. Monasteries underwent an enormous expansion during this 
period as they barely had military protection. The competition for labor was 
intensified, making it increasingly difficult for a feudal lord to benefit from the 
rising productivity brought by the flow of innovations.  
Serfs deserted numerously and continuously: the exodus of an entire peasant 
village, or even of a whole county, was not rare when the landlord was too 
inflexible. For example, in the 12th century, the severity of the landlord pushed 
the inhabitants of the Isle of Rhé to mass desertion, eventually forcing him to 
make concessions to retain some workforce. The landlords, for their part, sought 
to make mutual assistance agreements for the capture of fugitive serfs. However, 
the “market forces” tended to prevail, and, despite treaties and mutual promises, 
opportunistic behavior became the norm in active competition to attract and 
seduce the serfs of the neighboring domains, leading to concessions to the 
laborers. In many regions of France, these concessions translated into the laborers 
buying their tilts, which led to the formation of rural communes through village 
associations which, similarly to the towns, had their town hall and jurisdiction 
(see Dobb,M.1974, pp.65/66) . 
 The substituting of payments (“corvée”) in work, which characterized the ns 
classic feudal system, to payments in products and finally in money, represented 
the first step towards the general emancipation of the serfs, as it had a profound 
impact on the relations between servants and masters; impersonal and objective 
relations slowly replaced the personal relations between these two groups. 
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Takahashi (1972) observes that the change from payments in labor into 
payments of a fixed amount of money, as determined by jurisprudence, was also 
an essential factor in the transformation of feudal relations benefiting the 
workers, as productivity increased and the currency depreciated with inflation. 
Some landlords were able to escape from ruin by becoming themselves agrarian 
capitalists. 
 
 
Final considerations 
  
After the fall of the Roman Empire, the new political order that slowly 
asserted itself in Northern Europe, fragmented into competing feudal states that 
were also characterized themselves by the fragmentation of power between 
various institutions and organizations (corporations): the monarchy, feudal 
aristocracy, Church, independent cities, monasteries, universities and craft 
corporations. They had in common two distinctive cultural traits: (a) a Judeo-
Christian worldview, characterized by a linear and progressive conception of 
time, where nature is a divine creation offered to men, and a dignifying view of 
labor; (b) the affirmation and prevalence of individualism, as opposed to the 
predominant familism in other civilizations. This compound of cultural and 
political factors produced an unprecedented civilizational situation in terms of 
openness to the incessant introduction of cultural, political, organizational, and 
technological innovations.  
From the economic point of view, one can argue that among the most 
significant results of the political/institutional and cultural environment that 
characterized the period was the increase in marginal labor productivity, in sharp 
contrast with, for example, the case of China. Starting with the main productive 
sector, agriculture, and livestock, but extending to all others. The great crisis of 
the 14th century ended the medieval phase in the European evolutionary process, 
but not its legacy. In the restarting of growth in the 15th century competing 
centralized territorial states substituted to feudal competition; furthermore, a 
legacy of a comparatively high level of accumulation of physical capital 
(especially the capital represented by the vast network of wind and hydraulic 
mills and the equine herd); and, more importantly, the formation of centralized 
states did not eliminate fundamental cultural and institutional innovations 
generated during the medieval period – the Rule of Law, individualism, 
representative assemblies capable of limiting the power of the States, the respect 
for professions, the embryo of a culture of progress, of growth. 
Thus, although the rise of centralized National States made many of the 
medieval organizations that had an essential role in the innovative dynamism of 
this period disappear or mostly lose their autonomy – such as craft guilds, 
autonomous cities, the Catholic Church itself –, the evolutionary movement 
driven by Schumpeterian innovations continued and led to the Industrial 
Revolution in the 18th century. 
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